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Abstract
We present a security analysis of the widely-deployed Terrestrial
Trunked Radio (TETRA) authentication protocol, where we ﬁnd that
the TETRA authentication protocol suﬀers from ﬂaws that allow an
attacker to defeat basic authentication properties that are normally
required in secure operations. In order to launch an attack, an
adversary only needs to control the radio link communication (e.g., by
impersonating as a base station). This attack can be used to reduce
the users' availability of the network access, which may cause serious
consequences in an emergency scenario: a targeted mobile station may
falsely show that it is connected to the network while, in fact, the mobile
station is unable to receive network communications.
Based on this analysis, we propose a strengthened authentication
protocol for the TETRA system, and formally verify security properties
for our protocol proposal using the automated tool Scyther.
1 Introduction
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) is an ETSI (European Telecommunications
Standards Institute) standard, ﬁrst issued in 1995, for a mobile communication
system designed to be used by law enforcement, emergency and rescue service
organizations, in public transportation organizations, and as a general national
safety communication network. TETRA systems are widely deployed and in
operation in more than 100 nations. Norway is in the roll-out phase of the TETRA-
based emergency network "Nødnett", which is managed by the governmental
Directorate for Emergency Communication (DNK) and developed and operated by
Motorola Solutions Inc. [6].
While the GSM mobile system, also an ETSI standard ﬁrst issued in 1987,
has later evolved into the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
and now into the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) system speciﬁcations, there does not
appear to exist any follow-up of TETRA despite the age of its speciﬁcations, and
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as such TETRA can be regarded as the state-of-the-art in interoperability standard
for public safety use.
A trunked radio system allows many groups of users to time-share a few
radio channels by the use of statistical multiplexing techniques. The main
service of TETRA is voice communications. Some special features of this mobile
communication system are: very short call setup time (<0.3s), push-to-talk group
calling mode, and direct terminal-to-terminal radio transmission. TETRA provides
cryptographic authentication protocols, radio link encryption, and end-to-end
terminal encryption.
For emergency and safety communication networks it is imperative that they
stay operational even in extraordinary situations. Therefore, it is ﬁrst and
foremost important that TETRA oﬀers availability to authorized users, so that
emergency service/safety personnel can give and receive messages from dispatchers
and coordinators; for TETRA this is arguably more important than conﬁdentiality.
In general, a protocol that fails to oﬀer some security requirement may not
necessarily entail real-world consequences. For instance, an attacker who is able
to impersonate as an authorized user but who is not able to learn the secret session
key will not be able to obtain any read access to data, which is only available
encrypted under this session key. However, a security weakness of an authentication
protocol, even if it does not result in leakage of session keys (and therefore does not
violate conﬁdentiality), could be used to disrupt availability of service. We present
here three technical attacks that defeat authentication in TETRA. In one attack an
adversary can target mobile stations and lead them to falsely believe that they are
connected to the network.
Related Work Roelofsen made a rather high level description of the TETRA
security system in Ref [12], but his paper does not present or give any reference to
security analysis performed. We are aware of only one published security analysis
of the TETRA system, which is the recently published paper of Park et al. [11].
They assume a very strong attacker who is able to clone the secret key of the
mobile station and knows the user identity (phone number). However, they fail to
discover the weaknesses that we present in this work, nor do they analyze TETRA
authentication formally. This paper is partly based on the results of Shuwen Duan's
master thesis work submitted at Department of Telematics, NTNU in June 2013 [8].
Structure of this Work Section 2 gives a brief overview of TETRA's network
architecture suﬃcient for our analysis, and then describes in detail the TETRA
authentication protocol. Section 3 discusses the security weaknesses of the TETRA
authentication protocol we discovered, as well as their consequences. Section 3.3
presents our strengthened protocol construction proposal. Section 4 presents the
formal veriﬁcation of the strengthened protocol using the tool Scyther.
2 Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)
2.1 Overview of the Network Architecture
For the analysis purposes in this paper, we model the TETRA system to comprise
three main subsystems: Mobile Stations (MS ) at the users, Base Stations (BS )
as the radio access network, and the Switching and Management Infrastructure
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Figure 1: The TETRA Authentication Protocol; mutual authentication initiated by
the network SwMI . MS and BS agree on session key TB4(DCK1 ,DCK2 ).
(SwMI ) as the core network, which includes the Authentication Centre (AuC ).
An MS comprises both the physical terminal equipment, identiﬁed with a TETRA
Equipment Identity (TEI ) unique to each device, and a Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM ). The SIM keeps a unique TETRA user/subscriber identity and an associated
symmetric cryptographic key in tamper-resistant memory, and is able to execute the
cryptographic primitives applied in the authentication protocol.
2.2 TETRA Authentication Protocol
The TETRA authentication protocol is speciﬁed in [9]. TETRA supports both
unilateral and mutual authentications between terminals and the mobile network,
which can be initiated by either one. In this paper we only discuss the complete
mutual authentication protocol, as it is the strongest authentication property
covered by the speciﬁcations. Furthermore, we concentrate on the procedure
initiated by the infrastructure (Fig. 1). However, we can easily adapt attacks
presented below to break authentication of the weaker unilateral authentication
protocols as well as the mutual authentication initiated by the MS (Fig. 2). The
parties involved in the authentication process are MS , AuC and BS . We assume
the communication channel between AuC and BS to be secure and, therefore, treat
the AuC and BS together as a single party SwMI .
Figure 1 shows the message diagram of the TETRA mutual authentication
protocol initiated by the SwMI . After the AuC receives the Individual TETRA
Subscriber Identity (ITSI ) of the MS , it chooses the user's authentication key K
matching its ITSI . We note that the delivery of the ITSI is not speciﬁed as part of
the authentication protocol in [9], and, therefore, we do not include it in our analysis
below (and depict it in gray in Fig 1). Given the ITSI , the AuC then generates a
random seed RS and uses it with K to generate a pair of session keys KS and KS ′
through algorithms TA11 and TA21, respectively. KS , KS ′ and RS are forwarded
to the BS , which generates a random number RAND1 and computes the expected
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Figure 2: The TETRA Authentication Protocol; mutual authentication initiated by
mobile station MS . MS and BS agree on session key TB4(DCK1 ,DCK2 ).
response XRES1 and the derived cipher key DCK1 from KS and RAND1 under the
algorithm TA12. Then BS sends RAND1 ,RS to MS . MS then also generates KS
and KS ′ and computes the response RES1 and DCK1 , of which RES1 is sent back
to BS . The user also generates and sends a random number RAND2 to BS . BS
compares RES1 with XRES1 , and if the two values are equal it sets the value R1 to
true. Furthermore, BS computes the response RES2 and the derived cipher DCK2
from KS ′ and RAND2 under the algorithm TA22. It then returns RES2 and the
authentication result R1 ← true. Then MS compares RES2 with expected response
XRES2 , and if they are equal the MS ﬁnally returns the value R2 ← true. In case
both parties complete their runs successfully, they both use DCK1 and DCK2 to
compute under algorithm TB4 the shared session key DCK .
The algorithms TA11,TA12,TA21, TA22, and TB4 are not speciﬁed, rather it is
up to the operator to choose a secure implementation. The speciﬁcations [9] rather
vaguely demand that these functions satisfy some one-wayness properties1.
3 Weaknesses in TETRA Authentication
3.1 Attacker Model and Security Properties
3.1.1 Attacker Model
We analyze the TETRA authentication protocol with respect to the so called Dolev-
Yao security model [7]. In this model, the attacker is in full control of the network.
He can intercept any sent message and decompose it. The attacker, who can act
nondeterministically, may create and inject messages from information he learnt
from intercepted messages and from an unbounded number of fresh constants. He
can initiate an unbounded number of protocol sessions to be executed concurrently.
However, cryptographic primitives are assumed to be perfectly secure: For instance,
1For instance, [9] states about TA11 that the algorithm should be designed such that it is
diﬃcult to infer any information about Input 1 from the knowledge of Input 2 and the Output
(even if the details of the algorithm are known).
an attacker can only learn anything about the underlying plaintext of a given
ciphertext if he knows the corresponding decryption key. There is no partial
information of basic message components, e.g., keys or nonces, available.
3.1.2 Security Properties
In our security analysis we are interested in investigating whether the following basic
authentication and secrecy properties of two-party protocols are satisﬁed2:
Weak Agreement A protocol guarantees weak agreement to party A, if for all
protocol runs that A completes with intended communication partner B, party
B indeed executed a run with intended communication partner A.
Non-injective Agreement (Ni-Agree) A protocol guarantees ni-agree for party
A, if for all protocol runs that A completes with intended communication
partner B, there is a protocol run by B with intended partner A, so that the
content of the received messages in these runs is equal to the content of the
messages sent by the corresponding run of the intended partner.
Non-injective Synchronisation (Ni-Synch) A protocol guarantees ni-synch for
party A, if for all protocol runs that A completes with intended communication
partner B, there is a protocol run by B with intended partner A, so that
the content of the received messages in these runs is equal to the content of
the messages sent by the corresponding run of the intended communication
partner, and, additionally, the corresponding send and receive actions are
performed in the expected order.
Secrecy of Data A protocol guarantees secrecy for some data that party A holds
at the end of a completed run, e.g., the session key agreed upon in that run,
if an attacker does not gain any information on that data.
3.2 Breaking TETRA Authentication
3.2.1 Attacks against the Protocol
There is a rather obvious weakness in the TETRA authentication protocol depicted
in Figure 1: The acknowledgement bits R1 and R2 are not integrity protected!
Therefore, an attacker controlling air-interface communication may ﬂip these bits
at will. A more subtle weakness is, in addition, that the response RES1 sent by the
MS to the SwMI is not bound to the random number RAND2 . These weaknesses
are exploited in the following attacks:
Attack 1: The attacker observes a TETRA authentication protocol execution and
only intercepts and changes the last message R2 sent by the involved MS , i.e., the
attacker changes R2 from true to false. As a consequence, the MS believes that
it correctly authenticated itself to the network and shares with it a session key,
while the network believes that it completed a run, in which authentication was not
successful. This violates Ni-Agree and Ni-Synch in the role of MS . Note that this
is diﬀerent from cutting-the-last-message attacks, where the attacker simply drops
the last protocol message ( this is always possible) and its intended receiver never
completes that run.
2These properties are formally deﬁned in [10, 5] and are automatically veriﬁable with Scyther.
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Figure 3: Attack 2 against TETRA mutual authentication initiated by SwMI .
Attack 2: In this attack, depicted in Figure 3, the attacker intercepts the message
sent from the MS to the SwMI consisting of RES1 and RAND2 . The attacker
selects RES1 and replaces the value of RAND2 with a newly generated nonce
RANDINT . The SwMI believes the modiﬁed message was sent from the MS and
returns a message that contains RES2 computed from an incorrect random value
and R1 ← true. Therefore, the comparison test of RES2 and XRES2 fails on the
MS side and R2 is set to false3. However, the attacker intercepts the last message
and sends instead R2 ← true to the SwMI . In the perspective of role SwMI ,
security properties Ni-Synch and Ni-Agree do not hold.
Attack 3: 4 In this attack, depicted in Figure 4, the MS starts two concurrent
sessions both with the intended communication partner SwMI , while SwMI runs
a single session with intended partner MS . The attacker eventually makes SwMI
and MS falsely believe that they have agreed on the same session key. First, when
SwMI sends RAND1 ,RS to MS 's ﬁrst session, the attacker selects RS , generates
a fresh nonce RANDINT and sends RANDINT ,RS to MS 's second session. MS 's
ﬁrst session computes the correct response RES1 and returns RES1 ,RAND2 , with
a fresh nonce RAND2 , while MS 's second session computes the incorrect response
RES1 ′ and returns RES1 ′,RAND2 ′, with a fresh nonce RAND2 ′. Now the attacker
chooses RES1 from the ﬁrst session and RAND2 ′ from the second session, and sends
to SwMI the message RES1 ,RAND2 ′. As RES1 equals XRES1 , the infrastructure
SwMI sets R1 ← true, computes from RAND2 ′ the response RES2 ′ and sends out
RES2 ′,R1 . This message is then directed by the attacker to MS 's second session;
while the ﬁrst session is abandoned by the attacker. As RES2 ′ was computed from
the random nonce RAND2 ′ generated in the second session of MS , it is indeed
3Alternatively, the attacker may directly change RES2 , without replacing RAND2
4Unlike the ﬁrst two attacks, we discovered this attack with the help of Scyther.
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Figure 4: Attack 3 against TETRA mutual authentication initiated by SwMI .
equal to the expected response in the second session. Therefore, MS 's second
session sends out R2 ← true. At this point, MS believes in its second session
that it successfully completed a protocol run with SwMI , and SwMI believes that it
successfully completed a protocol run with MS . However, not only are the received
messages not equal to the sent messages of those sessions, the session keys computed
are also not equal. Recall that the session key is computed from DCK1 and DCK2 .
But the value of DCK1 , is computed in SwMI 's session from RAND1 , while inMS 's
second session it is computed from RAND1 ′. This violates Ni-Agree and Ni-Synch
in roles MS and SwMI .
3.2.2 Real-world Threats
In order to decide whether the three attacks presented in Section 3.2.1 have
any practical relevance, we need to consider more details from the TETRA
speciﬁcations.5 In practice, the TETRA authentication protocol is running within
the Location Update/Registration procedure, which is a Mobility Management
(MM) service, or it is running if an application on the MS explicitly requests
authentication via the Mobility Management Service Access Point (TNMM-SAP).
The registration procedure starts with the MS sending the U-LOCATION UPDATE
DEMAND message to the infrastructure. The infrastructure may then (optionally)
initiate the authentication process by sending the D-AUTHENTICATION DEMAND
5Alternatively, one could try to implement our attacks. However, we did not have access to a
TETRA test network, nor did we consider it an option to harm TETRA networks in operation.
message to the MS , i.e., the ﬁrst message of the authentication protocol. After
receiving the U-AUTHENTICATION RESULT, i.e., the last authentication protocol
message, the infrastructure returns D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT message to the
MS . The protocol data unit (PDU) of the D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT message
consists of the authentication result R1, the cipher key (CK) exchange information
and TEI request ﬂag indicates whether the infrastructure request TEI from the
MS. For mutual authentication (i.e., in security class 3), CK indicates the Common
Cipher Key (CCK). Each Location Area (LA) uses a single CCK at any given time,
i.e., it is shared by all mobile stations in the same LA. The CCK is used to protect
traﬃc and signalling sequences from the infrastructure to the mobile stations; either
by using the CCK directly as encryption key or, in case of group calls, by using the
CCK-derived corresponding modiﬁed group cipher key (MGCK).
Now we consider the feasibility of the three attacks from Section 3.2.1:
Attack 1 in Practice During location update/registration: After an attacker
modiﬁes the value of R2 in the last protocol message from true to false, the
network believes that authentication failed and sends a D-LOCATION UPDATE REJECT
message. In order to make the MS believe that authentication/registration is
completed successfully, the attacker needs to forge a D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT
message and substitute it for the D-LOCATION UPDATE REJECT message. According
to the TETRA speciﬁcations, the D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT PDU does not
necessarily contain message parts that prevent such a forgery. There is the option of
an MS requesting the CCK in the U-LOCATION UPDATE DEMAND message, in which
case, the D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT message must carry the CCK encrypted
under the session key DCK [9](e.g., page 56). This makes the forgery of the
D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT PDU infeasible, since the attacker cannot learn the
DCK. However, we note that requesting the CCK in the U-LOCATION UPDATE
DEMAND message is not mandatory. According to the speciﬁcation [9] (on page 30),
a once-registered MS may store one or more CCKs if it detaches from the network,
and, therefore, it may not request the CCK during re-registration. In practice,
an attacker may force re-registration by temporarily jamming mobile stations in a
given cell, which will afterwards try to re-connect/-register, giving the attacker the
opportunity to launch Attack 1. As a consequence, targeted mobile stations (and
their users) may falsely believe that they are connected to the network and ready to
receive messages. This can, at the very least, cause a loss of valuable time in which
the holder of these mobile stations cannot communicate with their coordinator and
colleagues.
During application requested authentication: Authentication requested explicitly
by an application running on the MS is not followed by something like the
D-LOCATION UPDATE ACCEPT message. As shown in the diagram in [9] (on page
48), right after the MS sends out the authentication result R2 to the SwMI , the
user application shall receive a TNMM AUTHENTICATE conﬁrm message. This means
that in this case theMS is not waiting for a message from the SwMI that is generated
using the session key. Hence, Attack 1 should be applicable in a straight-forward way
and the user should get a positive authentication results from its user application,
leaving the user to believe that the terminal equipment is working ﬁne, not realizing
that he or she is under attack.
Attack 2 in Practice On a protocol level, this attack achieves that SwMI believes
that authentication was successful, while MS believes that it failed, preventing an
MS to communicate with the SwMI . However, in practice, MS will initiate cell
re-selection if the check on RES2 fails, as speciﬁed in [9] (on page 46), i.e., MS
will try to connect to the network through a diﬀerent base station. This cell re-
selection applies to both location update/registration and user application initiated
authentication. This makes the execution of this attack diﬃcult in practice as the
attacker needs to control multiple base stations within the targeted location area.
In an emergency situation, a rescue worker may miss critical instructions in the
period, in which the MS is establishing re-connection while the MS appears already
connected to the network (and the rescue coordinators).
Attack 3 in Practice Out of the three attacks presented in this work, Attack 3
appears to be the least feasible in practice. This attack requires an MS to run
two concurrent sessions. However, according to speciﬁcations [9] (on page 44),
an authentication sequence that has begun but has not yet completed is called
pending, and [9] states (on page 44) that [if] a new authentication is started
then any pending authentication shall be abandoned. Again, this applies to both
location update/registration and user application initiated authentication. This
seems to prevent an MS from running two concurrent sessions of the authentication
protocol. Thus, this attack is not exploitable if a system is correctly implemented.
3.3 Fixing TETRA Authentication
It is straight-forward to see that the attacks against TETRA are possible because
(1.) lack of integrity protection on R2 6
(2.) lack of binding of RES1 and RAND2 7
One can easily verify that (1) enables Attacks 1 & 2, while (2) enables Attack 3.
Therefore, we propose to ﬁx the TETRA authentication protocol by
(A) adding integrity protection of R2 by adding the value of a message
authentication function TC1 over R2 and nonce RAND2 , and keyed by
KS ′′; i.e., the last message sent by MS should be changed from R2 to
R2 ,TC1(R2 ,RAND2 ,KS ′′).
(B) adding binding of RES1 and RAND2 by adding the value of message authenti-
cation function TC1 over RES1 and nonce RAND2 , keyed by KS ′′; i.e., instead
of RES1 ,RAND2 the MS sends RES1 ,RAND2 ,TC1(RES1 ,RAND2 ,KS ′′).
In both 2 and A, the KS ′′ should be generated by MS and AuC from RS and
their long-term key K using a key derivation function that is diﬀerent from TA11
and TA21. Our proposed ﬁxes take into account the network infrastructure in
practice, where the mobile station initially shares secrets only with the AuC but
none with the base stations. Our proposed ﬁxes require the introduction of an
additional key derivation function (for generating KS ′′, so none of KS ,KS ′,KS ′′ is
used for multiple cryptographic primitives) and an additional function TC1 for
6of R1 in the protocol of Fig. 2
7of RES2 and RAND1 in the protocol of Fig. 2
role MS {
var RS: Nonce;
var RAND1: Nonce;
fresh RAND2: Nonce;
recv_1
(
SwMI,MS, RAND1, RS
)
;
send_2
(
MS,SwMI, TA12(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS), RAND1), RAND2,
TC1(TA12(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS), RAND1), RAND2, TAX1(k(MS,SwMI),RS))
)
;
recv_3
(
SwMI,MS, TA22(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS),RAND2
)
, R1);
send_4
(
MS,SwMI, R2, TC1(R2,RAND2,TAX1(k(MS,SwMI),RS))
)
;
claim_MS1
(
MS,Niagree
)
;
claim_MS2
(
MS, Weakagree
)
;
claim_MS3
(
MS,Nisynch
)
;
claim_MS4
(
MS,Secret,TB4(TA12b(TA11(k(MS,SwMI),RS), RAND1),
TA22b(TA21(k(MS,SwMI),RS), RAND2))
)
;
}
Figure 5: Example input to the Scyther tool
message authentication. There are no additional messages introduced and the
additional computational overhead can be negligibly small. We note that, in mutual
authentication, sending R1 is redundant, as it is implicit by sending a challenge
RAND2 , that the check on RES1 passed. Similarly, there is no need to send R2,
only the resulting value TC1(R2 ,RAND2 ,KS ′′).
4 Formal Veriﬁcation of TETRA Authentication
4.1 Scyther Basics
Scyther [4] is a tool for the automatic veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation of security
protocols. It is freely available at [4]. Scyther analyses protocols with respect
to the Dolev-Yao intruder model. Its algorithm is guaranteed to terminate, at
which point Scyther establishes unbounded veriﬁcation (i.e. for an unbounded
number of protocol session and freshly generated values, and an unbounded message
size), falsiﬁcation (by presenting an attack trace), or bounded veriﬁcation (i.e. the
assurance that no attacks exist within a certain bound) of a wide range of
basic authentication and secrecy properties, including the properties presented in
Section 3.1.2. A description of Scyther's patterns and pattern reﬁnement algorithm,
based on the approach of [13], is beyond the scope of this work. For a detailed
description of Scyther's theoretical foundations, we refer to [2, 5].
Scyther has been deployed to analyze the standards of industrial security
protocols IKE (v1 & v2) [3] and ISO/IEC 9798 [1]. In [3], it was used to verify
more advanced security properties of authenticated key exchange security models.
4.1.1 Input language Basics
In general, messages are modeled as terms which can be constructed from atomic
terms and constructor function symbols. An atomic term is any alphanumeric string,
which represents, e.g., a (global) constant, a nonce or a variable. Scyther comes
with predeﬁned constructors for pairing, hash functions, signing and encryption,
of which the latter constructor can be used for both for symmetric and asymmetric
encryption. Scyther's language is typed: There are predeﬁned types including Agent
Figure 6: Scyther Results for TETRA Authentication with proposed ﬁxes of Sec. 3.3.
(for protocol participants) and Nonce. Protocols are modeled as sets of roles; for
instance, in the case of TETRA one declares in the input ﬁle (after the declaration of
user types, functions and global constants): protocol TETRA(MS, SwMI ){ role
MS{...} role SwMI { ...} }. Each role is a set of events (mostly send and
receive events, but also some claims and pattern matching).
The role role MS of the MS as in the network initiated authentication
of Figure 1, is given in Figure 5. At the beginning, there are two
variable declarations for nonces RS and RAND1 that are received during a
protocol run. Furthermore, a nonce RAND2 is generated. Then the event
recv_1(SwMI ,MS ,RAND1 ,RS ) denotes that the MS receives, supposedly from
the network SwMI , the message consisting of the two nonces RAND1 ,RS .
Then in event send_2(MS , SwMI , . . .) the MS sends to the intended receiver
SwMI the message TA12(TA11(k(MS , SwMI ),RS ),RAND1 ),RAND2 together
with the binding discussed in Section 3.3, where TA12,TA11,TAX1 and TC1
are globally declared as hash functions and k(MS , SwMI ) denotes the symmetric
key shared between MS and SwMI . Here TA11(k(MS , SwMI ),RS ) models
KS and TA12(TA11(k(MS , SwMI ),RS ),RAND1 ) models RES1 . Then, in
the next event recv_3(. . .), the MS receives a message that must equal
TA22(TA21(k(MS , SwMI ),RS ),RAND2 ) and the constant R2 , i.e., KS ′ equals
TA21(k(MS , SwMI ). Again, TA22 and TA21 are modeled as hash functions. We
note that in our model the constants R1 and R2 only represent the value true, i.e.,
we are not modeling the traces in which R1 ← false or R2 ← false are explicitly
sent by the honest protocol participants. The last send event in role MS is the
sending of R2 ← true together with its integrity protection (see Section 3.3).
4.2 Veriﬁcation Results of TETRA Authentication Protocol
We veriﬁed the security of our proposed ﬁxes to TETRA authentication with
Scyther.8 For the MS , we asked Scyther to verify the properties ni-agree, weak
agreement and ni-synch as well as the secrecy of the session key, by adding
claim_MS1(MS, Niagree), claim_MS1(MS, Niagree), claim_MS3(MS, Nisynch) and
claim_MS4(MS, Secret,TB4(TA12b(TA11(k(MS, SwMI), RS), RAND1), TA22b(TA21(k(MS,
SwMI),RS), RAND2))) to the end of role MS (see Fig. 5). For the role of the network
(role SwMI ) we asked Scyther to verify the symmetric claims. Scyther's GUI
output for the veriﬁcation of these properties for both role MS and role SwMI is
8In order to obtain our Scyther input scripts, please contact one of the authors.
given in Figure 6. Scyther indeed veriﬁed all these security properties for the TETRA
authentication protocol after ﬁxing it (as proposed in Sec. 3.3). We also used Scyther
to verify the corresponding claims of the original TETRA authentication protocol:
it found that ni-agree and ni-synch were violated in both role MS and role SwMI .
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) authentication protocol.
We show several novel protocol-level attacks against TETRA and discuss real-
world attack scenarios, which allow an adversary to disrupt availability but which
are prevented by the TETRA speciﬁcations. We propose ﬁxes to the TETRA
authentication protocol, which we verify with the automated tool Scyther with
respect to the Dolev-Yao security model.
As the disruption of availability can be particularly harmful for emergency
networks, our results may especially be interesting for authorities of those countries,
where the roll-out of TETRA has not started or been completed yet, e.g., in Norway.
Acknowledgement: We thank Cas Cremers for helpful comments on verifying
authentication properties with Scyther.
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